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AMERICA AND THE WAR.

I.
Patriotic Duty.
I rode across the Andes into La Paz, Bolivia, with a
friend, a German cavalry officer, and learned tm.t the war had
begun a week before.

To the fir st person who asked me "On

which side are your sympathies?"
purely .American."

I answered, "My sympathies are

I heard a bull-fighter ask the steward on a

Spanish steamer if he was not for the Gennans.
the same natural

wa~T ,

"Soy Espanol!"

He replied in

If a man takes his citi-

zenship seriously, he must be a nationalist.

No IIRn can serve

two masters.
There is only one loyalty, and that is exclusive.
of us do not have to be told this.

Most

Those not born here were

solemnly told it in the oath which was the honorable condition of
their naturalization.
citizen.

The burden of proof is upon the new-made

He should be the most careful of all.
The campaign to "organize" the Americans of a certain

blood or birth into "an army of shouters" for the country, right
or wrong, which they swore to cast off when they had the honor to
take the oath of allegiance to the United states of America, is
outrageous enough to warrant the sharp reproof of the American
Government and of the American people it is that Govern!!lent's duty
to stand for.

·why?

Because, first of aJ.l, a partizanship, to be

justified, must be based on love of America, devotion to .America's
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high int ere st, and it must be spontaneously .American.

As fox

transcendant moral considerations, .America's Vl.{)rthy interests will
be on their side too.
Apparently some of our newer cit iz ensfe.re for getting these
things.

They are agitating because of love of a foreign power,

not because of anxiety for the good of America.

And while that

group of citizens are drawn into this alien agitation, the mouths
of the vast majority are more or less closed by proclamations beseeching them to an utter neutrality which they cannot be expected.
to feel.

Now a country is a jealous mistress.

Those of us who

are Nationalists by :cature must remind our fellowcitizens who are,
in this exci tanent, forgetting themselves, that they must be
nationalists too, and Americans not aJ.one in :name.
As for the public propaganda by high personages sent
by foreign Governments to try to create in our country imperium
in imperio, a cabal of our citizens to serve their alien policies,
it is hard to believe that our Government an:l our public opinion
have so far tolerated them.
of arms is lawful.

The open and above-board export

The organization of an expedition for alien

warlike purposes, within our jurisdiction, is unlawful.

The

moral wrong of the thing lies in its alien purpose to use our co untry for an alien war.

Is there any difference, morally, between

a shooting expedition and a "shouting" expedition for a purpose
alien to .America's interests?
In 1888 interference in American domestic affairs
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brought to an abrupt end Sackville-west's Embassy to Washington,
and he has not been the only one.

Can there be a grosser int er-

ference in our domestic affairs than that publicly reported propaganda of Bernsdorff and Dernberg?

Is there a more sacredly

and purely American affair than the direct moulding of our opinion and policy in the delicate position we occupy in this war?
A few dignified statements would pass, - but propaganda, an appeal to the racial feeling of a small minority, an attanpt to
a s to the substance of the propaganda,

"organize" our citizens!

the German Government has no case for appeal to Americans on
grounds of our interests or of morality.
scarcely dare to try to

ma.n~.pulate

Otherwise they would

us through the racial preju-

dice of a part of our citizens.
It i s to be hoped that the vote of a group with foreign
sympathies does not make our Government fear to be boldly .aIIlerican.
If so, it is time to prohibit all immigration for a while.

It is

time to organize an American p!Jrty, - a Natio:calist Party or League
of the vast majority of us who with proper leadership will think
nationally, not as the tools of alien influence, and who will in
our everyday concerns think m.tionally, not parochially.

If

existing political parties have not the hardihood to be nationalist, let them then be re legated to local politics.
The future is long.
bili ties in south America.

The war opens for us great pos siIn the countries of the now accessi-

ble belligerents we have the chance to replace the products of
those not now exporting, and later to supply much also to those
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countries which will be loath to buy from their late enemies.
Our trade pot entiali ties loom in dazzling richness in the years to
come, - if our business men build for all the to-morrows instead
of just for to-day, and if our Government gives them efficient
support and intelligent direction.

The British have a law to

direct the national financial strength where it shall benefit the
nation,

they are encouraging enterprises to replace their enemies'

industrial specialties for export everywhere.
German methods is almost proverbial.
from Washington?

The efficiency of

Have we a long-sighted plan

Are our Government, capital, and skill co-opera-

ting to avail, not of the paltry gambler's chances of to-day, but
of the huge profits of the long future?

If not, then in those

quarters our serious nationalist duty to our great country is being
ignored or sacrificed to opportunism, as it is in other quarters
being sacrificed to a wrong or illegal double allegiance.

From

smuggling to honest but greedy and shortsighted shifts, whether to
export or to buy a merchant marine, - all this would be unworthy
of a deep patriotism.

i
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II.
Diplomatic Questions.
Before discussing the attitude naturally taken by the
overwhelming majority of patriotic americans towards the war, it
is p,e rhaps well to discuss a little the questions which have arisen

with Great Britain.

Until the "Ge:rman" ..wneri cans have sobered

down, i.e., been freed from foreign tutelage, plain Americans must
take exclusive charge of these.

The south is very purely .American,

but :naturally wants to export its cotton.

It ought to want a

policy that will take care of next year's crop for all time;
for to-day only.
ici-box.

not

Copper, also, will keep without being put in the

Greed, like racial sym:pathy, must bow to patriotism and

foresight.

National rights

± rightful

national interests

= policy.

rve will not see a valuable right taken nor even a useless one rudely
flout ed.

But let us not too dogmatically stand on the quicksands

of int erna ti onal law.

It is not worth while , fo r such law is only,

thus far, the equity of strong nations.

The conditions of the law of

adaptation to changing conditions.
"effective

Its whole history is an

blockade", for example, have just now :passed away with

the demonstration of the submarine.

Otherwise, it is evident

that the British Navy would now effectively blockade every German
port.

The British Navy may possibly feel that these changed con-

ditions must be met by such an adjustment as international law
always makes to new conditions.

It is fUtile as well as bad pOlicy

to strain and strive too far for international legalities, because
nothing in them is permanent but their morality and their equitable
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'!) principles.
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The BI'i ti sh, for example, might perhaps say that now,

~·

since the submarine does awey with the old-fashioned "effective
blockade," the effective blockade out at sea of a trade-route should
suffice.

Our own coast line is ro long that to admit this princi-

ple, properly hedged about, could not hurt and might help us in a
fut ur e war.

Such a possible theory may be mentioned because to

find a formula to reconcile the intent of the doctrine of

11

effective

blockade" with the new conditions created by the submarine is a
definite problem.

We must not let our ideas get frozen in past

formulae, nor must we heed propagandists in the :ray of foreign
Governments.
enemies.

So much fo:r Britain's right literally to starve her

As for British treatment of our ships destined to the

ports of neutrals contiguous

to their enemies, the standing of

the doctrine of Continuous voyages is sufficient to justify careful
scrutiny of neutral ships bound to such ports.
As to contraband and conditional contraband, her rights
are clear enough.

We are, on the other hand, quite right in

seeing that those rights shall be exercised in a COIIBiderate manner.
Now there arise other difficult questions.
be surprised.

We need not

Of course there must arise hard questions.

The

point is to let no interested persons excite us ab ,o ut them and to
solve them calmly, with conciliation, and will.
"eye on the ball".

We must keep ou:r

And the ball is the long run, ultimate ad-

vantage and honor of our country.

Here a:re the questions:

the

(3)

purchase by us of German ships during the war;

and, second, the

placing of such shiJ?S, under our flag, on trade routes to Germany
or to countries which are gate-ways to Germany.

Trade from a

neutral to a belligerent has been sanctioned by international law.
But it is subject to the right of search, to blockade and to the
risk of seizure of conditiom.l or absolute contraband.

If the

Gerrran ship was in Ge1many we could not buy it and get del.i very,
because it would be seized at sea as enemy property.
ships are in .American harbors.
capture by our hospitable asylum.

But the

They are protected from British
Such ships may be of a guasi

public character, due to potential armament, partial government
ownership, or other cawe.
intern ed.

In that case they are to be considered

It nny well be argued that the idea of interning is to

preserve the status quo of the ships until the end of the war;
that what is interned is in the custody, as a trust, of the interning Government.

For a neutral Government to buy ships interned

with it, (as perhaps contemplated by the indefensible ship purchase bill} would be so unusual as hardly to be consistent with
friendly comity towards the other belligerent.

It would be a

little like its interning an army and then :rnying aJ..l the cost.
To put ships so bought on trade rout es favorable to the belligerent
seller would be a little like taking on the interned army as mercenaries against the other belligerent.

For a neutral Government

to buy purely private belligerent ships ls.id up for asylum, although not interned, with it, would be a degree less questionable.
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The Declaration of London, which we helped frame, intimates something, I think, on this subject.

At any rate, according to the

Declaration of London, ships for warlike use are absolute contraband and all ships are conditiona1 contraband.
bought by private persons a belligerent's

shi~

So is money.

If

must be guaranteed

against the possibility of again becoming the belligerent's.

It

is bad enough if their use, by supplying him, gives the same belligerent one advantage of ownership.

As for Government purchase

of belligerent ships, of course a neutral's citizen may loan money,
subject, morally, to his own country's interests, but mat of the
neutral Government's making a direct or indirect financial contribution to the belligerent?

In trying out, on the European trade

routes, the rights of neutrals on the sea under conditions so
changed by the submarine and air craft as to tend to change international

Ja;w

itself, let us do so with .American private owned ves-

sels with no taint of previous belligerent ownership.
start no fresh "wooden nutmegs' fable.

Let us

If the shiµ;i are quasi

public, and so interned, their purchase is a financial contl'ibution by a netural Government to a belligerent Government.

If

the ships are private, and so merely la.id up in the protected asylym of our harbors, their purchase by a neutral Government is a
financial contribution, b_y the neutral. Government, to the belligerents' great shipping investors.

They, in turn, are relieved

financially and can contribute the more to the war.

The head of

one of these great shipping trusts is reported to be in charge of
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the German army's food transport.
ly private.

Suppose the ships theoretical-

Our private citizens can buy the buildings of a

belligerent on Manhattan Island.

But these ships, he would buy

owe their existence to the political protection of asylum in our
harbors.
The rights of neutrals are intend.ad to safeguard
their ordinary activities.

In legitimateiy taking advantage of a

war situation, they should consider whether the effect upon the war
of swift reversals of policy by themselves is morally neutral.
With all the seas to roam, such a ship is placed on at rade route
favorable to a belligerent.

All right, but it is enough like

changing the conditions after the game started to make the shipowner's
Government patient and reasonable in his international law contentiois
Let us get a merchant marine as soon as possible, but let us do it
without starting another "wooden nutmeg" legend.
The Trust relation created by interning or laying up
belligerent ships in our harbors makes us, as trustees, responsible
to our cestiquitrust (Germany) to see that those ships be not
molested in our harbors.

It makes us responsible to the other

cestiquitrust (Great Britain) to see that our harbors be not I!lBlde
a basis for the use of those ships against Great Brita.in.
say we buy them and put them on routes to serve Germany.
purchase price is money for Germany's war:

trust get?

The

the trade route is food

supply, directly or indirectly, for Ge:rrnany's army.
trust eats his cake and keeps it.

Then

One cestiqui-

What does the other cestiqui-
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Great Britain must not, of course, appeal to our sense
of jootice while harboring even inc id en tally the motive o:r desire
to keep us off the seas as her future rival in the carrying trade.
She must treat us no more as she did in her unsound or grasping
contentions in the Pana.ma tolls question.
vate owned ships.

We want .American pri-

Frank negotiation can find a way.

Conditions

and times of deferred :p3.yments, pxoposed trade routes, all such
matters are suitable subjects for trustee and cestiquitrusta.tr to
discuss and adjust.

Also, even such questions as an option, for

Americans to buy desired ships, at an agreed price at the close of
the war.

England would be willing to promise much in return for

consideration now.

III.
America's attitude and Interests.

America's attitude during this war should be dictated
by American interests, morally, first; materially second.
Among our

interest~,

three questions stand out.

None

of these questions properly concern any persons who have American citizenship and who yet are swayed by the love of any
other country rather than by the love of Ameri9a.

Our citjzens

of German blood are here because they prefer our ways and our
ideals to those oi' Germany.

In preferring our ways and our

ideals they perforce prefer the "Anglo Saxon" ways and ideals,
for there is no evading the fact tr.at our "language, ins titutions, and laws" are British.
so are our old hooks.
nation, are British.

Our nursery rymes are British:

Our foundations, the first seeds of our
A

building cannot disregard its founda-

tions nor a garden its seeds.

Aftar all the years, in ideals

and wa:rn we are still more on the British than on any other
pattern.

If we think that we ought to survive, then we cannot

help thinking· that those we most resemble should survive.
German Americans and all cannot deny

that they prefer the
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Anglo-Saxon idea of liberty to the new Germany's idea that
might makes right and that any means whatever i.s justified by
ambition.

Therefore we would rather be confronted by British

than by German overgrown power@·

And therefore it is to the

interest of America that the Allies win.
The second question is:
intere s t after the war ?
standing.

what is fOing to be to our

Probably an Anglo-American under-

With the objects of promoting peace, making war .

between the two countries as u nlikely as possible, and, incidentally , perhaps making some adjustments of spheres of interest.
For example the Philippine

Islands might enter into a bargain

whereby we :s·bould acquire more appropriate territories in and
about the Ca rribesn.

As for givingaway the Philippines.

F.ow

could that be done honestly unless by a majority elected party
which had stood clearly on that policy or by a referendum to
the people whose blood and treasure bought them ?

An Anglo-

American understanding may conceivably be the basis of a practical arrangement for universal peace.

It may form a

to which other powers would join their pQlicy and the police
force of their arms.

At least, it holds as good a hope as any

in sight.
The third question is what friends and what enemies
is our attitude during the war to make us ?

rt will certainly

be very stupid if we succeed in gaining no friends but in rather
irritating all the Powers concerned.
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And are we not headed just that way ?

The Germans

know that American feeling and thought naturally favor the
Allies.

There would in no case, then, be any question of

gaining the friendship of the Germany of to-day.

The Germany

of to-morrow may be very different.
And the Allies ?

Neitber our Government nor even a

member of Congress demands to know about Germany's knownviolation of Hague conventions to whi ch we and Germany areparties,
or about the alleged or even the proved and known German atrocities.

I r: time of peace we do not hear, without a murmur our

conventions reported violated.
Congo and the Putumayo.

We at least investigate the

It is not that we should assume

con-

clusions injurious to Germany; but we should demand to knww; we
should throw

our wei gh t for the right when there are loud

report of wro ng .
We give the Allies the curious silence first mentioned.
~

-

ifvt"\ /

Then the export of sections of submarines to them was disallowed
through a/\.far-fetched citation of the Alabama case.

~-~~ jC,~/wild
l~ ~-~""'

~~~~--~~·/

Tb.ere was

talk, in which the influence of the peace propaganda/\was

vis i ble,.of changing the neutrality laws. ·
To change the rules of the game after the game has
started would be the grossest violation of fair play.

The rules

can only be changed after the game bas started if new conditions,
not comtemplated by t r ose rules, require their modification in
order t hat permanent principles may find application to new
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conditions.
Silent

~efore

reported German violations of conventions

sjgned with ourselves, silent before reported German atrocities,
we at first leaned backwards in discouraging the export of war
materials when

Brjtain's costly fleet has, in the regular

course of the war game, created a situation in which the Allies
would chiefly benefit by that trade.
It is really much to be hoped that the intelligent
self-interest of the United States will regard the broad aspects of the future in the formulation of policy, and will not
be concen trated upon temporary material advantages or upon the
shifting sands of ephemeral international legalities.
It is only by good fortune that Germany

~ade

war in

Europe instead of attempting to annex, say, Brazil, or Venezuela and Columbia.

The British and Americans dislike one

another less than either dislikes any other people.
nations, that is a great deal.

As among

The heart of the mass of

Americans, like their interest, is wi th Great Britain and the
Allies.

The triumph of British ideas is more palatable and

safer for us than the triumph of German ideas.

If we were

shrewd we mi ght join the war, gaining friendships and advan"
tages

whi~e

supporting the ideas that stand nearest to our own.

At least let us think of the future and not gain the hate of
Self-interthe Allies as well as the dislike of the Germans.
est points us, in this, where our heart is too.

----------------

